



REPLY TO
ATTENTION OF

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS, V CORPS
UNIT 29355
APO AE 09014

Policy Memorandum # 9

AETV-CG

MEMORANDUM FOR SEE DISTRIBUTION

SUBJECT: Sergeants' Time Training (STT) in V Corps

1. References.

- a. USAREUR Command Policy Letter 2, Sergeants Time Training, 8 December 1999.
- b. FM 25-100 (Training the Force), 15 November 1988.
- c. FM 25-101 (Battle Focused Training), 30 September 1990.

2. Intent. Sergeants' Time Training (STT) is an invaluable opportunity to focus unit-level training on combat-critical collective tasks, while simultaneously enhancing individual soldier skills and promoting leadership development. To maximize resulting benefits to our soldiers and units, there are certain parameters we should follow while planning and conducting STT.

a. General.

(1) *Satisfy the "Spirit and Intent" of applicable USAREUR STT principles.* Per reference 1a, the USAREUR/7A CG has established the following STT guidelines.

(a) During STT, NCOs will conduct performance-oriented (i.e., hands-on) training with their respective squads, sections, or platoons, focusing on individual and collective tasks that directly support their unit's ability to fight and win in combat.

(b) NCO leaders will plan and organize the training and are responsible to the chain of command for its effectiveness.

(c) Training will last five hours per session, occurring once per week, normally on Thursday mornings between 0700 and 1200.

(d) Everyone who will "go in harm's way" with a unit should be present at and participate in the unit's scheduled STT.

(e) Officers will be present at the STT, assisting in training, evaluating overall effectiveness, and providing encouragement and suggestions where necessary.

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(f) Unit CSMs will ensure STT trainers possess requisite subject-matter expertise, are afforded adequate preparation time, and have thoroughly rehearsed planned instruction.

(2) *Emphasize NCOs and Their Critical Leadership Role.* NCOs are the backbone of our Army, assessing the technical and tactical capabilities of their assigned soldiers, serving as principal mentors during one-on-one instruction, and leading from the front in combat. Effective STT programs are built upon our NCOs, relying on them to doctrinally assess unit-training levels (see references 1b and 1c), identify performance shortfalls, and recommend STT events that directly address identified shortfalls. Additionally, NCOs actively plan, execute, and supervise all scheduled STT events, providing their first-hand knowledge to participating soldiers and, thereby, developing mutual trust and confidence.

(3) *Provide Adequate Officer Oversight and Involvement.* Unit commanders should validate proposed STT events, based on candid NCO input, unit-level training meeting discussions, and their assessment of collective skills required to conduct upcoming operational events and training exercises. Moreover, they will ensure that NCOs possess adequate training resources, provide trainers with essential instruction tools and adequate preparation time, and make timely suggestions during pre-instruction rehearsals.

(4) *Recognize the Direct Linkage Between Collective Task Proficiency Levels and Underlying Individual Skills.* Every collective task is the cumulative sum of numerous individual tasks. Consequently, some individual skill training events are directly linked to combat-critical collective proficiencies and, as a result, provide fertile STT opportunities. Specific examples include, but are not limited to, expert infantry and field medical badge tasks, common task test topics, small unit battle drills, and low-density MOS skills (e.g., parachute rigging and night vision calibration) that enable the execution of collective events.

(5) *Stress Ingenuity and Initiative.* Modern combat will require our soldiers and leaders to be bold, innovative, adaptable, and unafraid to grab tactical opportunities through judicious initiative and calculated risk-taking. To possess these attributes during future conflicts, we must first develop and hone them through demanding peacetime training. With this end-state in mind, V Corps NCOs and officers should routinely employ personal ingenuity and initiative, while planning, resourcing, and conducting STT events and related activities.

b. Specific.

(1) *Desired Execution Interval.* Units should strive to conduct STT every Thursday from 0700 to 1200 hours. However, the actual execution time and frequency is dependent upon METT-T considerations.

(a) The first O6 in the chain of command has the authority to cancel the weekly training or to temporarily change the scheduled STT day. This can occur when the unit is operationally engaged, deployed from home station for major training events, or other unique

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unit-level circumstances (e.g., ongoing training exercises, extreme weather, recovery, services, etc.).


(b) General officers may permanently change the scheduled STT day and/or execution time for units in their command only if they can articulate a very compelling argument based on negative, low-range impact to the operational readiness of the unit (e.g., select aviation units). Permanent changes to the Thursday morning schedule will be the exception. Planned changes will be fully coordinated with the local BSB/ASG and supporting activities to minimize conflicts and maximize participation levels.

(2) *Pre-Execution Planning.* Battalion commanders should brief planned STT events at brigade-level QTBs.

(3) *Participation.* Involve all soldiers in STT, including borrowed military manpower and special duty personnel. One hundred percent participation is the desired goal.

3. The aforementioned execution guidelines are not onerous or excessive, providing unit commanders and NCOs with the flexibility to develop and conduct highly productive STT programs. To acquire the skill sets required to successfully meet and defeat tomorrow's adversaries, we must conduct realistic, combat-focused training. Anything less will undercut our Corps' operational potential and combat lethality.

4. Victory Corps!


JAMES C. RILEY
Lieutenant General, USA
Commanding

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